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THE INFLUENCE OF THE THARUHAT AUTONOMOUS
STATE COUNCIL (TASC) IN A KAILALI IN THE FAR-
WESTERN TARAI
ABSTRACT
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006 and the Nepal entering a post-
conflict era has been associated with the emergence of various organisations and
movements often formed along ethnic lines. The Tharuhat Autonomous State Council
(TASC) is one such movement that is the focus of this paper but more generally has
received relatively limited focus within academia.
Within the context of Kailali district in far-west Nepal, this paper explores various
characteristics and policies of the wider Tharuhat movement focusing on the vision for
an autonomous Tharu state. It will highlight some of the successes and problems that the
movement faces. Furthermore, this paper will explore a number of tensions between the
national Tharuhat discourse and how this finds meaning and resonance at the local level
where activists are attempting to engage with the Tharu community. Ultimately this paper
examines the extent to which the Tharuhat movement represents a new more political
stage in the wider Tharu ethnic movement.
Key Words: Tharuhat; Madhesh; identity politics; movement; Western Tarai
Matthew Maycock*
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INTRODUCTION
This paper will briefly explore and analyse
various aspects of the Tharuhat
Autonomous State Council (TASC) led
Tharuhat movement in reference to
perceptions of the movementinKailali
district, far-west Nepal. Furthermore, the
paper will explore the reasons why the
TASC was initiated; some of its principal
policies and the meaning the Tharuhat has
for a number of predominantly Kamaiya
informants in Kailali District. The inroads
the TASC have made in generating support
in Kailali emerges as, at times, quite
narrowpointing towards limited resources
(at a range of levels) which to an extent
hasimpeded the development and influence
of TASC at the local level. It will also explore
how experiences of the People’s War have
contributed to shaping political allegiances
and persuasions within post-conflict Nepal.
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Ultimately, I will argue that a number of
inter-linked factors can help to understand
the emergence and formof movements such
as the TASC in post-2006 Nepal. The United
Community Party of Nepal (Maoist)
(UCPN(M))through the 10 year long
People’s War is often credited with having
led to the increase in political awareness
amongst various disadvantaged groups
such as the lower castes, women and ethnic
groups in Nepal.Therefore, the extent to
which the People’s War can account for the
politicisation of Tharu identity will be
critically engaged with throughout.1
Contextually this paper will not principally
engage with the political processes that the
TASC is involved with in Kathmandu, but will
explore how the nationally represented
discourses find meaning and resonance at
the local level where activists are attempting
to engage with the Tharu community.2
Before exploring these processes in more
detail I will now turn to a number of
contextual necessities, beginning with a
background to the Tharuhat. As will emerge
below the Tharuhat represents in some
ways a change from the sorts of Tharu
specific political bodies that pre-exist this
movement and it is this that forms the
central concern of this paper.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TASC
The meaning of the term Tharuhat seems
quite interchangeable in various contexts.
For example, it is commonly considered a
movement, a political entity as well as a
specific region of the western and far-
western Tarai (and for some the entire
Tarai). Throughout this paper I refer to the
Tharuhat in this broad sense in reference
to the ways this term is understood and
discussed in the areas in which I undertook
fieldwork. However, more specifically as
will become clear below the implicit
understanding of the term Tharuhat is that
it is closely associated with the TASC. The
TASC was established following the signing
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) in 2006 and to an extent is a
movement incorporating a range of pre-
existing Tharu organisations3,4 of and for
the specific demands of post-conflict Nepal.
Essentially the TASC is an umbrella
movement of Tharu organisations working
towards achieving a shared agenda
(principally for an autonomous state within
a federal Nepal). When discussing the actual
vision of this state with activists it sounded
very much like a kind of socialist vision. For
example, there was a consistent emphasis
1 While beyond the scope of this paper Jan Andolan I and II also have had an important influence in
the rise of rights and identity based politics in Nepal. Furthermore, although it would be unlikely
for a Tharuhat leader to admit it, the success of the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF) in 2008 CA
elections and resultant prominence of Madeshi issues would have also provided impetus for the
inception of the Tharuhat and other similar organisations.
2 This paper relates to ESRC funded fieldwork undertaken principally in the east of Kailali district
as well as Dhangadi throughout 2009.
3 And therefore incorporates a specific Tharu elite from these organisations which include the
Tharu Welfare Society and BASE.
4 The number of associated organisations has varied over time since the inception of the movement.
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on equality of opportunity and the equal
distribution of land and resources. It isa
movement principally relevant in the
districts of the mid and far-western Tarai in
districts in which the Tharu constitute a high
proportion of the population.
The wider Tharuhat movement is mainly
composed of the Tharuhat Autonomous
State Council (TASC) and Tharuhat Joint
Struggle Committee (TJSC) with the latter
having a stronger focus on agitating against
the ‘one madhes one state’ political
movement.5 However, while this paper
refers to the Tharuhat throughout in a
general sense (in reference to the use of this
term locally) this is largely in reference to
the TASC who are leading the representation
of Tharu concerns in relation to the writing
of a new constitution. Furthermore, the
relationship between the TJSC and TASC has
at times been strained due to
anearlieralliance between the TJSC and the
Madeshi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF),6 an
alliance that was unexpected given the
predominance of anti-Madeshi sentiment
within the Tharuhat movement (and
especially the TJSC). However, due to an
apparent ‘Maoist line’ within the MJF this
alliance was short lived. Former PLA
Commander, Laxman Tharu was central to
establishing both the TASC and TJSC and his
leadership and position of prominence
remained relatively unchallenged until the
alliance with the MJF. However, subsequent
to this alliance some ideological differences
in the leadership of the TJSC and TASC have
perhaps emerged, although the two bodies
work closely together and certainly at the
local level this distinction has
littlesignificance. The TASCis also a member
of the Federal Democratic National Forum
(FDNF) along with other state councils such
as Limbuwan, Khambuwan and
Tamangsaling etc….  This alliance
constitutes a specific vision of a new federal
Nepal in which ILO 1697 is
consistentlymentioned.
Currently the TASC is the pre-eminent
Tharu movement/organisation in Nepal. It
is commonly represented as a movement
by the Tharu and for the Tharu. However, it
did not emerge without being preceded by
a range of organisations representing quite
different stages and tones of the Tharu
ethnic movement. Of the multiple Tharu
organisations pre-dating the TASC, Giselle
Krauskopff (2008) identifies the Tharu
Welfare Society and the Backward Society
Education (BASE) as the two preeminent
Tharu organisations.8 Both these
organisations have been associated with
the TASC and TLSC (with for example,
5 There are also a range of additional associated bodies such as the Tharu Student Society, Tharu
Artist Committee etc…
6 The MJF is currently a political party in Nepal focused on the creation of a Madhes autonomous
region in the Nepali Tarai (although more orientated towards the east while the Tharuhat focus on
the western Tarai).
7 ILO convention 169 was adopted at the International Labour Conference in Geneva in 1989. This
convention focuses on the human rights of Indigenous and Tribal People (such as the Tharu).
Nepal became the first country in South Asia to ratify the convention in 2007.
8 There are of course a broad range of additional Tharu organisations some affiliated to the Tharuhat,
some not (associations became more fragmented after the Tharuhat’s association with the MJF).
These include, the Nepal Loktantrik Tharu Sangh, Tharu Rastriya Mukti Morcha etc... However, it
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senior members from each organisation on
the TASC central committee). However,
recently (as of February 2010) the Tharu
Welfare Society removed its support from
the TJSC due to the ‘betrayal’ of the
association with the MJF. However, BASE
has remained consistently engaged perhaps
reflecting some of the differences
Krauskopff identifies between the two
organisations (-2008: 228-9). Therefore,
one cannot consider the politicisation of
Tharu identity in the form of the Tharuhat
without incorporating the influence of these
two (and other) organisations and the wider
Tharu ethnic movement.
With the existence of the well-established
Tharu organisations and Tharu ethnic
movement they represented, one naturally
arrives at a number of critical questions:
what are the objectivesof the TASC and why
did it emerge? As will transpire below there
are some critical differences between the
TASC and the nature of the Tharu movement
and associated organisations that came
before. Initially these changes seem to
represent an evolution from a Tharu ethnic
movement to a more adversarial Tharu
political movement complemented by a
reconfigured relationship to a reconfigured,
post-conflict state. Furthermore, the
predominant TASC demand for a Tharu
autonomous state represents a direct
challenge to the current state and political
structure in Nepal.9However, TASC leaders
confirmed though that their vision for this
autonomous state was contained in the
overarching framework of a broader Nepali
state, which would be constituted of a
number of other ethnically orientated
autonomous states (the other members of
FDNF for example). Therefore, were no calls
for Independence from Nepal but an implicit
acceptance of working within the
boundaries (not just geographic) of the
Nepali nation state.Critically the emergence
of the TASC has to be situated within a very
different set of circumstances i.e. volatile
and frequently violent post-conflict
situation, and this following a conflict that
contributed to the increased political
awareness of many disadvantaged and
disempowered groups across Nepal.
The TASC’s structure is organised with a
President, vice-President and Treasurer
who are all central committee members.
The original central committee members
were selected at their first conference
(around May 2008) by election. Now they
are selected in general meetings (which take
place sporadically) and elections don’t
appear to be held anymore.The national
structure is reflected at district level. While
in relation to TASC funding (at both local
and national levels) there is little clarity in
where the movement gets its funding from.
I met several TASC activists from Dang who
talked about the system of taxation (largely
focusing on natural resources) that the TASC
implemented with some businessmen and
landowners in the district,however, there
didn’t seem to be a similar system evident in
Kailali. When I discussed funding with TASC
is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the implications of the PW for these organisations
and the nature of their association with the Tharuhat. This is not to say that they are not significant
in Kailali and further afield, but the Tharuhat is very much currently the predominant Tharu
organisation in Kailali.
9 There are a range of additional demands such as invoking ILO 169, the higher representation of
Tharu across all areas of the state that are invoked to greater or lesser extent at different times.
Matthew Maycock Tharuhat autonomous state council
82
leaders in Kailali I was told that most of the
funding they received was from donations
from a range of Tharuhat supporters who
tended to be affluent and Tharu.This was
supplemented by both cross border and
natural resource taxation although the
leaders I spoke to were less clear on the
details of this (or were less willing to talk to
me about such forms of income).
Laxman Tharu is anextremely influential
figure and reference for activists at a range
of levels within the wider Tharuhat
movement. He is presented as someone
who comes from a very humble
background and lives simply. The popular
discourse amongst activists is that he rose
from humble beginnings to be a leading
Tharu within the PLA (People’s Liberation
Army), and was then subsequently
marginalised.10 Perhaps as a result of the
lack of personal opportunity in the PLA he
began the Tharuhat.Alternatively, some
view his leaving the PLA as more ideological
referring to his criticisms of the Brahmin
bias in the upper echelons of the PLA. The
predominant Tharuhat discourse relating to
Laxman Tharu’s background thathe comes
from a poor background is functional for
the Tharuhat at a number of levels, not least
that it helps protect the movement from
criticisms of elitism and ensures the
engagement of activists from more humble
backgrounds. Furthermore, the reasons
given for him having left the PLA (then
called Comrade Roshanwhere he was a
Battalion Commander in the now 7th
Division) are many and contradictory.
According to Laxman he left the PLA
because of the lack of opportunity for him
and other Tharu within the UCPN(M) due
to it being Brahmin dominated. al This
perhaps refers to the Maoist affiliated
Tharuwan being Brahmin led. That the
former leader of the TASC and TJSC is both
so influential and controversial is of
particular relevance for the Tharuhat at the
district and local levels, to which I will now
turn.
THE  THARUHAT IN KAILALI
Local meanings
Importantly the local understand of the
differences between the TJSC and TASC are
blurred with respondents consistently
simply referring to the Tharuhat
movement. And it is within these limitations
that the discussion below will be framed.
This also in part refers to the then closeness
of the TJSC and TASC while this fieldwork
was undertaken (throughout 2009) while
more recently at times there seems to be a
more pronounced distinction between
these two entities (as well as instances of
collaboration). While the national
background is, of course, important the
principal focus of this paper is local
activism and reflections on the Tharuhat.
Along with Dang, Kailali district is
considered by Tharuhat activists as
something of a Tharuhat stronghold.I was
told on many occasions by Tharuhat
activists and members that the Tharu are
the largest group in Kailali, something
confirmedby the last census.11 This as well
10 He was well respected as a committed fighter and leader within the PLA although cadre currently
in the cantonments (both Tharu and non-Tharu) were quite reluctant to talk about him due to his
desertion.
11 According to Population census 2048 (AD 2001) Tharu was spoken by 47.5% i.e. 198497 people
in Kailali.
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as Laxman Tharu coming from the district
perhaps explain why the movement is so
popular in Kailali? At several pan-district
meetings there were many interesting
discussions between activists from various
districts (the discussions outside of the
meetings in local Tharu restaurants seemed
to be most engaging). These conversations
tended to involve a great deal of competition
mainlybetween the young men present. For
example, activists from Kailali were
convinced this is the district with the
strongest Tharuhat support a fact that was
reflected by it having the most
comprehensive bandh12. At the various
times when bandh were called how tightit
was, (in relation to length of bandh as well
as the extent to which the it was observed)
was considered a direct reflection of the
strength of the organisation in this specific
district. Stories were also compared
aboutthe number and type of vehicles that
had been torched in order to enforce the
bandh.
The Kailali the Tharuhat have entered into
is not a politically vacant district ready to
receive its various messages but one in
which the UCPN(M) were and to a
significant extent still are the predominant
political force. The strength of support for
the UCPN(M) is reflected in the CA election
results in 2008 when they won all 6 seats in
the CA (prior to this election, Kailali was
previously a Nepali Congress stronghold).13
Although at the time the Tharuhat was not
in a strong enough position to field any
candidates. Furthermore, Kailali is home to
the cantonments of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) 7th Division and the Young
Communist League (YCL) are a visible and
strong presence across the district. So much
so that in some villages the Nepali state still
had not returned with VDC office or staff,
health postsor a police presence.
Of the more locally focused Tharu
organisations, perhaps the one that troubled
local activists most was the Tharuwan (and
the associated branch of the YCL).14 This
should be contrasted with the national
Tharuhat leaders more Kathmandu
orientated discourse focusing on the
Madeshi parties (at least up until the alliance
with the MJF in early 2010). This was one
area in which the peripheral and central
Tharuhat discourses had quite a different
emphasis. Unlike many of the other Tharu
organisations the Tharuwan is not aligned
to the Tharuhat (as it is Maoist affiliated)
and the two have an adversarial
relationship with a number of low level
skirmishes being mentioned by activists
from both sides.
These two bodies are sometimes,
mistakenly, conflated but there are
important differences between the two.
While the Tharuwan is the Tharu wing of
the UCPN(M). The leader of the Tharuwan
in Kailali district (Comrade Akhanda) is not
only a Brahmin but also a Pahari. This was
regularly invoked by Tharuhat activists as
a sign of the lack of true engagement with
the issues of the various ethnic groups in
Nepal. Tharuhat members and supporters
would often ask me to highlight where the
leading Tharus are in the PLA or UCPN(M)
12 Meaning strike
13 The Tharuhat have 1 CA member - Rukmani Chaudhary.
14 The Tharuhat do have an associated youth wing the Tharu Students Society (Tharu BidyarthiSamaj)
although this is not as prominent in Kailali as the YCL or Youth Force.
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both nationally and locally as they
considered this impossible to do. However,
this does overlook the four (out of a total of
six) Tharu UCPN(M) CA members from
Kailali elected,  all of whom are not
considered to be overly influential and
senior within the wider Maoist movement.
The lack of representation at the higher
levels of the UCPN(M) by the Tharu both
locally and nationally was clearly a
motivation for some Tharu leaders such as
Laxman Tharu to join the Tharuhat. While
some within the group of largely Dhangadi
based Tharu elites would not have joined
the Tharuwan at any stage due to ideological
reasons anyway.
An important event in Kailali helps to
illustrate some of the differences between
the Tharuhat and Tharuwan. In early
December 2009 there were a number of
violent clashes between forest settlers and
the Nepal Police in Baliya VDC in the east
of Kailali district. The police stated that these
settlers (largely landless Pahari’s) had settled
illegally and the clashes led to five people
being killed. This made headline news across
Nepal for a number of days and resulted in a
UCPN(M) led nationwide bandh. Instantly
the UCPN(M) (including some members of
the Tharuwan) supported the settlers and
sent YCL members to support them in their
fight against the police. Conversely,locally
the Tharuhat refused to support the settlers,
refusing to acknowledge that they might
have any claim to this land, as this was
considered part of the Tharuhat region and
therefore any Pahadis, however
unfortunate,should not be entitled to settle.
The responses to this event are illuminating
in so far as they refer to quite different
visions of what a future Tharu state would
look like. The vision expressed by leaders in
Kathmandu is perhaps more inclusive than
the vision expressed locally in Kailali where
there is a stronger emphasis on the Tharu
as opposed to those living in the
autonomous state area. Furthermore, the
Tharuhat response to the Baliya clashes
seemed to be of concern quite a large range
of non-Tharu groups in Kailali as it was
mentioned to me on a number of occasions
as an indication of the Tharuhat’s lack of
consideration for non-Tharu groups in the
district. Therefore, locally the vision of the
Tharuhat autonomous state is a state
predominantly for the Tharu community
who have an exclusive claim to be
indigenous to the proposed region.
Bandh
Alongside the violence that has been a
peripheral part of the Tharuhat’s day to day
workings a number of specific areas
warrant attention in relation to the
movement’s emergence in a post-conflict
situation. These are the Tharuhat’s use of
bandh and the Tharuhat Liberation Army
which was established and now principally
based in Kailali. While other Tharu
organisations have used bandh as part of
their protests, the Tharuhat have taken this
to new levels. Bandh as we all know have
been daily occurrences throughout post-
conflict Nepal and this is an approach that
the Tharuhat deploy on a quite regular basis
(not least with two major bandh in early
2009).15 While bandh are a major feature of
post-conflict Nepal, causing significant
15 These were principally against the ‘one Madhesh’ demands of the Madheshi political parties and
the inclusion of the Tharu in the category Madeshi. This bandh initially seemed to be successful
in its aims as the two week bandh that ended on March 15th 2009 with an agreement between the
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disruption to daily life theyhave not as yet,
received significant academic analysis.16
Tharuhat bandhhad three mains demands:
an autonomous state; that the Tharu to be
appropriately represented in the new
constitution;and to be considered distinct
from the Madeshi category. As a
bideshi(foreigner) who often cycled around
the eastern villages of Kailali, I consistently
encountered local activists enforcing the
bandh.I spent some time on an impromptu
barricades that Tharuhat activists had built
and that were manned by groups of young
men during a number of local bandhs in
order to stop the flow of traffic (which was
in any case non-existent). The atmosphere
at barricades wasrather convivial with a
significant amount of raksi(locally brewed
alcohol) drunk and Tharu songs sung.
Violence and the Tharu army
Violence (or the threat of violence) is, to
some extent,integral to bandh culture. For
example during the Bandh in April 2009
several VDC offices were destroyed in Dang
and Kailali. Many vehicles were destroyed
along the highways during this bandh as
well - in order to enforce the bandh. More
generally low-level violence has at times
been a part of the activity of the Tharuhat
within Kailali. However, this was often
reported as being far less central to the
workings of the Tharuhat than the YCL
which was more closely associated with the
PLA and the People’s War than the
Tharuhat. The establishment of the
Tharuhat Liberation Army in Kailali was
announced in November 2008 and
represents a new chapter in the Tharuhat’s
struggle for rights and autonomy. This is
unprecedented in previous Tharu
organisations and is specific to ‘post’-
conflict Nepal. Clearly several forms of
violence (many more deadly) have ceased
with the signing of the CPA in 2006,
however there are still new forms of
violence (and associated threats) that in
some senses are becoming more
mainstream in contemporary Nepal. For
example, this might include new forms of low
level violence and disruption of local lives
and opportunities. The stated aim of the
Tharuhat Army is: "to make the revolt of
the indigenous people successful".17 It was
established in part to repel anyone who
might threaten or oppress Tharu’s.
According to local leaders in Kailali the
Tharuhat Army is also for the protection of
the border with India and is established for
law and order purposes and the protection
of the Tharuhat Autonomous region. There
are many rumours amongst Tharuhat
activists of a Tharu Army barracks within
the forests of Kailali. This is where training
is received from former PLA combatants
and I was told that this would be the starting
place for any future Tharu army offensive
against the Pahari’s and Madheshi’s. In some
respects the links between this army and
Tharus who were formerly in the PLA
appear to be quite strong as all the leading
members and trainers in the Tharuhat
Liberation Army I met had previously been
in the PLA. The barracks seemed to have an
then government and the TJSC which lead to statement that the Tharu would be removed from the
Madeshi category (although I was told later that in reality this didn’t happen due, in part, to a
change in government).
16 It would be interesting to undertake an analysis of pre and post-PW forms of protests and bandh.
17 Laxman Tharu quoted in http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2008/nov/nov04/news06.php
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almost mythical status amongst activists
although I didn’t meet one who had actually
been there (or was willing to talk to me
about it). Whether the army actually exists
or not doesn’t in some sense seem to be of
critical importance. More importantly for
the activists I met is an understanding that a
Tharu army is possible (and mythologised)
and that the Tharu community are able to
mobilise in this way should it be necessary.
The rhetoric surrounding the Tharu Army
amongst Tharuhat leaders and activists
varies significantly and is often
contradictory. For example, it is called a
‘Peaceful Army’ or an army without
weapons by many Tharuhat supporters.18
It has also been described as something
similar to the YCL or Youth Force, acting
simply as a means of engaging with younger
Tharus. Furthermore, Laxman Tharu has
mentioned that the Tharuhat Armies
arsenal of weapons is not sophisticated.19
Therefore, the Tharuhat seem to want to
be taken seriously in relation to their
capacity to orchestrate violence (perhaps
in reference to armed groups in the Eastern
Tarai). However, in reality perhaps the
movement does not have the intention or
capacity to realistically do so to the levels
experienced in other parts of Nepal.
While the number of young men and
women who have been trained to form the
ranks of cadre subsequent to them having
joined the Tharuhat is unclear, I know from
several confirmed sources that the
Tharuhat ordered 4000 uniforms from a
uniform factory in Kathmandu. Laxman
Tharu has stated the somewhat ambitious
aim of having an army of 100,000).
However, it has been reported that the
Tharuhat have not been very successful in
recruiting members to their army,20
although local leaders dispute this.
Ultimately, there are areas in which there
appears a continuity of violence within a
post-conflict Nepal not least in relation to
low level violence and bandh but
importantly a number of discontinuations.
For example, when one considers the rise of
a PLA up to and prior to 1996 there appears
to be little synergy with events and
formations in relation to this and the
formation of the Tharuhat Liberation
Army. This ‘army’appears to be a quite
different entity in so far as it is formed very
much within existing state structures (with
associated monopolies of violence) the as
opposed to constituting an ideological
alternative to the state.
CONCLUSION
The 10 years of the People’s War and the
subsequent post-conflict environment are
critical to understanding the emergence of
the TASC and some ways in which it
functions. Following the signing of the CPA
in 2006 violent behaviours took new forms
and found new meaning in a range of new
originations and groups. These
organisations facilitate the continuation of
certain types of violence into post-conflict
Nepal. Perhaps the most obvious example
of this is the Young Communist League (YCL)
and the Madeshi movement in the eastern
Tarai although the TASC and TJSC certainly
contribute to these processes and the
frequent instances of low-level violence in
18 Raising in one sense an interesting question as to what constitutes an army.
19 "Nepal: Tharu Revolt imminent if identity ignored," Telegraph Weekly Magazine, 25 October 2008,
20 As noted by Oliver Housden http://173.201.29.101/portal/index. php? action = news _ details &
news_id=15904
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Kailali. Therefore, the People’s War can help
to understand some of the more violent and
disruptive aspects of the TASC’s daily
workings. Furthermore, the volatile post-
conflict situation in many regards helps to
explain some of the specific aspects of the
TASC, not least the propensity of specific
kinds of often low-level violence and bandh.
There are a number of important synergies
between the TASC and other movements in
Nepal especially in relation to ideology
where a certain socialist vision infiltrates
many visions of autonomous states
(especially within the FDNF). While the
TASC also represents a number of significant
differences from the other movements one
currently observes in Nepal, especially in
relation to the reiteration of a specifically
mythologised shared history and a linked
claim to a specific area of land. The TASC
movement was principally established in
order to ensure the creation of the Tharuhat
Autonomous State. While it is unclear if and
when this might happen (as of June 2011–)
one has to ask what would happen if this
were actually achieved. For example, some
(mainly supporters of the UCPN (M) in
Kailali) have asked if there were enough
skilled Tharu to be able to enable the various
elements of a Tharu autonomous state to
functionproperly. What would the situation
be for non-Tharus within an autonomous
state? What would the establishment of
Tharuhat Autonomous State mean for the
various Tharu sub-groups such as the
Kamaiya and Rana Tharu? Would it be
beneficial to all Tharu or a more specific
group (perhaps the current leaders of the
movement)? Answers to these questions
remain unclear, however if and when a
Tharuhat Autonomous State is established
it will be extremely interesting to see how
the internal dynamics of the state develops.
The TASC has circumvented the restrictions
on the establishment of ethnically
orientated political parties through its
membership of the FDNF. Despite not
fielding candidates in the 2008 CA election,
currently the TASC has one representative
in the CA (Rukmini Chaudhary) under the
auspices of the FDNF.21It will be interesting
to see how the Tharuhat fares in Kailali and
across the rest of the Tarai in the next
election (whenever that might happen)
when it will be able to field candidates across
the proposed Tharuhat Autonomous State
area. However, currently there is clearly
limited local awareness of the Tharuhat and
its policies and mixed support for the
movement. Furthermore, the UCPN(M) has
a much stronger and more comprehensive
network of activists and more funding. The
UCPN(M)’s vision for a federal Nepal
encompasses the Tharuwan which is similar
in some respects to the vision for the
Tharuhat Autonomous State. This
represents the most fundamental challenge
to the TASC, a challenge that shows no sign
of receding. Success for the TASC in terms
of the mainstream political process in Nepal
is perhaps improbable anytime soon and a
great deal of work remains to be done by
activists both nationally and locally to
increase awareness and support for the
movement.
While this is very much a work in progress
I have tried in this paper to explore some of
the areas of influence and also some of the
limitations of the TASC in Kailali. It is clear
that within Kailali the TASCand TJSC
represent an important movement with
21 Although there are Tharu CA members from other parties, principally the UCPN(M)
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influence and support within a range of
Tharu groups and villages. However, the
extent to which the TASC leadership (and
therefore to an extent the Tharu leaders who
came before) have been successful in
creating a pan-Tharu identity is very much
in question. It is not uncommon to meet
Tharus who show little interest in the
Tharuhat, or simply do not support it. With
the lack of representation of a range of
Tharu sub-groups (not least the Kamaiya
and Rana Tharu) these questions constitute
a significant challenge to the TASC from
within the diverse Tharu community.
However, in my conversations with TASC
leaders both in Dhangadi and Kathmandu it
became clear that this is a challenge that the
leaders of the movement are largely not
concerned about. The leaders I met seem far
more concerned with building a movement
quickly, a movement with significant
influence in Kathmandu and Dhangadi
leading to an autonomous state. I met a
number of Tharuin Kailali who told me that
they viewed the movement’s leaders as
having in some ways‘Brahmin like’
tendencies.22 This was due to the
predominance at senior levels in the TASCof
a specific class of Tharu and their apparent
lack of meaningful engagement with the
broader range of Tharu sub-groups.
Furthermore, there is a conspicuous lack of
women in senior positions in the movement
(other than perhaps Rukmini Chaudhary).
This is also reflected at the district level in
Dhangadhi where women are rarely
actively involved in Tharuhat meetings and
discussions. Therefore, one then has to
question the solidity of the movement with
significant potential for internal splits and
fragmentation (which to an extent one can
already observe in relation the TJSC and
TASC) although the TASC seem to be coping
better with such challenges. Furthermore,
this raises important questions about who
will be the beneficiaries of the TASC policies
should some of these be achieved. Would the
interests of the Tharu elites that dominate
leadership positions within the movement
be met? Or conversely woulda successful
TASC transform and improve the lives of the
diverse Tharu sub-groups across the
proposed Tharuhat autonomous region?
Without a Tharuhat autonomous state in
existence answers to such questions are
quite unclear. However, there currently
emerge a number of disconnections
between the leadership and the wider Tharu
community that if the TASCand TJSC is to
generate widespread support will clearly
need to be addressed.
Giselle Krauskopff in her excellent chapter
exploring a quite different, earlier stage of
Tharu ethnic movement (principally
focusing on the Tharu Welfare Society and
BASE) asks whether this movement can
lead to "ethnic politicisation in a more
radical and oppositional sense than so far
seen" (2008: 240). As this paper indicates
in some respects the TASC and TJSC do both
represent a more radical and oppositional
stage in a wider Tharu ethnic movement and
there have considerable achievements to
date for example in raising Tharu issues in
Kathmandu and mobilising many (but not
all) Tharu at local and regional levels.
However, the extent to which the TASCand
TJSC will successfully establish a politicised
pan-Tharu identity, an autonomous state and
ultimately lead to improvements in the lives
of Tharu across Nepal currently remains
unclear.
22 These informants meant this is a negative sense in reference to a perceived Brahmin dominance
of Nepali politics.
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